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MAKING FURTHER INQUIRIES: POLICING IN CONTEXT IN BRIXTON AND KHAYELITSHA 
BILL DIXON* 
william.dixon@nottingham.ac.uk 
Only rarely do inquiries into policing investigate the social context within which it takes place.  This 
article looks at two inquiries which chose to take on this task: >ŽƌĚ^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƌŝǆƚŽŶ
Disorders in London in April 1981; and Justice CatheriŶĞK ?ZĞŐĂŶĂŶĚĚǀŽcĂƚĞsƵƐƵŵǌŝWŝŬŽůŝ ?ƐŝŶƚŽ
the current state of policing in Khayelitsha in the Western Cape.  It argues that they should be 
applauded for doing so but draws attention to how difficult it can be to persuade governments to 
address the deep-rooted social and economic problems associated with crises in policing rather than 
focus on reforming the police institution, its policies, procedures and practices. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his book, The Politics of the Police, the British police scholar, Robert Reiner, makes the point that 
 ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞ ĂƌĞŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨĐƌŝŵĞĂŶĚĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ?ǁŚŝůĞ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂƌĞ
ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĂĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĚĞĞƉĞƌƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ?1  He argues that indulging 
ŝŶǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůƐ ‘ƉŽůŝĐĞĨĞƚŝƐŚŝƐŵ ?- the assumption that the ƉŽůŝĐĞĂƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚŝŶďůƵĞůŝŶĞ ?ƚŚĂƚ
preserves society from dissolving into a state of violent chaos - is implicit in most if not all public 
discussion of policing, and a good deal of academic writing on the subject too.
2
   
It is also widely recognised that their relationship with the public  W the people who are policed as 
well as those on whose behalf policing is done  W is critical to everything that the police do.  This view 
is shared by observers whose perspectives on policing differ sharply in other respects.  Thus the 
 ‘ďƌŽŬĞŶǁŝŶĚŽǁƐ ?ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐGeorge L Kelling and James Q Wilson emphasised that scarce police 
resources need to be deployed to support citizens in neighbourhoods at  ‘the tipping point ? where 
ƉƵďůŝĐŽƌĚĞƌŝƐ ‘ĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚŝŶŐďƵƚŶŽƚƵŶƌĞĐůĂŝŵĂďůĞ ?.3  Herman Goldstein, the founding father of 
problem-oriented policing, insisted that the police should focus on problems identified by the 
communities they serve, and seek to mobilise the public in resolving them.
4
  Writing in 1979 as an 
ƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌŽĨ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?ƐDĞƚropolitan Police, John Alderson argued that providing 
 ‘ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĚŝƐƉĞůůŝŶŐĐƌŝŵŝŶŽŐĞŶŝĐƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĐŽ-operative social 
ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁĂƐ one of ten objectives for police in a free society.5   
Similar considerations are relevant at a societal level. Looking forward to the post-apartheid era in 
South Africa in 1994, John Brewer argued that the legacy of oppressive colonial policing could not be 
overcome in the absence of a wider process of social change.   ‘No amount of police reform ? would, 
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ŚĞǁƌŽƚĞ ? ‘ĂůƚĞƌƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƉolice-public relations ?ƵŶůĞƐƐƚŚĞ ‘structural inequalities and problems 
of South African ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? were addressed.6 
There is then a large measure of agreement over the need to recognise three things: the limitations 
of the police (and, to be more specific, the public police) as guarantors of order in the face of social 
forces well beyond their control; the centrality of the relationship between the police and the public 
to effective policing; and the urgency of social and economic change if meaningful police reform is to 
be achieved.  So it is surprising how rarely inquiries into policing take account of the social context 
within which policing is done, and attend to the social conditions that gave rise to the issues they 
have been charged with investigating.   
CASE STUDIES 
The purpose of this article is to look at the work of the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of 
Policing Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations between SAPS and the Community of Khayelitsha 
( ‘K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ ? )ǁŚŝĐŚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽĚŽƚŚŝƐ, 7 and to compare its efforts to set policing in its social 
context with those of the inquiry into the Brixton Disorders conducted by Lord Scarman in 1981 
 ? ‘^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ? ) ?8  These two inquiries have been chosen as case studies because, though they took place 
over thirty years apart and focused on policing in cities (Cape Town and London) on different 
continents in countries (South Africa and the United Kingdom) with contrasting, if overlapping, 
histories, they have much in common.  Both were set up in response to what seemed to be a chronic 
breakdown in trust between police and policed (albeit with more or less acute symptoms); and both 
ǁĞƌĞůĞĚďǇǀĞƌǇƐĞŶŝŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞũƵĚŝĐŝĂƌǇ ?ŽŶĞĂƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇƌĞƚŝƌĞĚũƵĚŐĞŽĨ^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ
ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŽƵƌƚ ?ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĂƐĞƌǀŝŶŐŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨǁŚĂƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŶŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŚŝŐŚĞƐƚĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƚŚĞ
House of Lords).   
Scarman was asked to inquire into three days of public disorder on the streets of inner city London in 
which 279 police officers and at least 45 members of the public were injured; K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ into 
complaints of inefficiency and a breakdown in relations between the community and the police in 
what apartheid-ĞƌĂĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐůŝŬĞĚƚŽĐĂůůĂ ‘ŚŝŐŚĚĞŶƐŝƚǇƚŽǁŶƐŚŝƉ ?.  Both inquiries decided to 
set the policing issues they had been asked to consider in their social context.  K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ devote 
ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?Ɛ ? ?ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐƚŽ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨ<ŚĂǇĞůŝƚƐŚĂ ? ?WĂƌƚƐ//ĂŶĚs/ŽĨ
^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŶŝŶĞƉĂƌƚĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚĂƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌƐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂů
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ? 
The approach adopted by K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ, and by Scarman, can be contrasted with the narrower 
scope of inquiries into the fatal consequences of events at the Marikana platinum mine in South 
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ĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐEŽƌƚŚtĞƐƚWƌŽǀŝŶĐĞŝŶƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞĂƚŚŽĨƚŚĞďůĂĐŬƚĞĞŶĂŐĞƌ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶ>ĂǁƌĞŶĐĞ
on the streets of Eltham in south London on 22 April 1993.
9
  The Marikana Commission of Inquiry, 
ĐŚĂŝƌĞĚďǇĂƌĞƚŝƌĞĚũƵĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚŽĨƉƉĞĂů ?/ĂŶ&ĂƌůĂŵ ?ŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ƐƋƵĂůŝĚ ?ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ
prevailing in Nkaneng and other informal settlements around the mine, but was more concerned 
with a forensic dissection of its owner ?s obligations to provide housing to its workers under the 
terms of a legally bŝŶĚŝŶŐ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚůĂďŽƵƌƉůĂŶ ? ƚŚĂŶǁŝƚŚĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?
circumstances and what might be done to improve them.
10
 Though it idĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ‘ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚ
ƌĂĐŝƐŵ ? ?ŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŵŽƌĞďĞůŽǁ )ĂƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨĂĐƚŽƌŝŶƚŚĞDĞƚƌŽƉŽůŝƚĂŶWŽůŝĐĞ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?Ɛ
mishandling of the investigation of his death, the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (also led by a retired 
judge) has been criticised by one well-placed observer ĨŽƌĨĂŝůŝŶŐ ‘ƚŽƉůĂĐĞ ?the murder] in the 
ďƌŽĂĚĞƌŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨďůĂĐŬ ?ƉŽůŝĐĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚŝƐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŶŐŝƚĨƌŽŵ ‘ƚŚĞůŽĐĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐŽĨ
ƌĂĐŝĂůǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ?11  
COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY 
Part of the explanation for this unwillingness to explore the social context of policing may lie in the 
nature of commissions of inquiry defined by Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan as time-limited institutions 
external to the executive but set up by a government or a minister at her/his/its discretion and 
charged with the principal task of investigating past events.
12
  At times of crises, he suggests, 
ŝŶƋƵŝƌŝĞƐĂƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ ‘ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƵŶŝƋƵĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽƉƌŽǀide an impartial assessment, and bring 
certainty and closure in situations of doubt and ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?.13  dŚĞǇƐĞƌǀĞĂƐ ‘ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ? ?14  But, in doing so, they represent a threat to politicians playing a 
 ‘ŚŝŐŚ-stake game of ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƵƌǀŝǀĂů ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂǀŽŝĚŝŶŐďůĂŵĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽƌĐƌŝƐŝƐƵŶĚĞƌ
investigation may be as urgent a priority as finding out what happened, or making sure that it does 
not happen again.
15
   
For the pragmatic politician establishing an inquiry into an aspect of policing, the advantage of 
limiting its scope to the police - a bureaucratic organisation staffed by a disciplined body of public 
servants - may appear obvious.  Deftly conducted by someone with a suitably safe pair of hands, an 
inquiry may serve to shift the focus of government policy from issues of social structure to what at 
least appears to be a less intractable set or problems to do with the direction and operations of the 
police.  In this ideal world, the police can be both blamed for what went wrong and made 
responsible for putting things right.  Without being too cynical about the motivations of those 
behind the K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ and Scarman inquiries it is tempting to see this kind of thinking behind 
the terms of reference they were given, the way those mandates were interpreted and, more 
obviously in the case of Scarman, ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ response to their findings.  The appointment, terms 
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of reference, findings, recommendations and impact of these two inquiries are the subject matter of 
the next three sections of this article. 
APPOINTMENT AND TERMS OF REFERENCE  
The background to ƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞK ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ and Scarman inquires has been referred 
to briefly above.  A little more needs to be said at this point if their appointment, and the task with 
which they were entrusted, are to be understood.   
dŚĞK ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝŝŶƋƵŝƌǇǁĂƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚďǇ,ĞůĞŶŝůůĞ ?ƚŚĞWƌĞŵŝĞƌŽĨƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶĂƉĞ ?ŽŶ ? ?
August 2012 to investigate allegations of: 
a) Inefficiency on the part of the South African Police Service (SAPS) operating from the three 
police stations in Khayelitsha and in the area more generally; and  
b) A breakdown in relations between the Khayelitsha community and member of the SAPS.
16
  
These allegations had been made by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in 
Khayelitsha.  The NGOs referred to eight cases which illustrated the problems with policing in the 
area.  They ranged from inadequacies in visible policing to shortcomings in the investigation of crime 
(particularly crime committed against foreign nationals, lesbian, gay, transgender and inter-sex 
(LGBTI) people and members of other vulnerable groups) and the response to specific policing 
challenges including illegal liquor outlets, youth gangs, vigilantism and domestic and sexual violence.   
The Commission was appointed under section 1 of the Western Cape Provincial Commission Act 10 
of 1988 and was intended to give effect to powers contained in section 206(3) of the Constitution 
ƉĞƌŵŝƚƚŝŶŐƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐƚŽ ?ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚŽƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ‘ŽǀĞrsee the effectiveness and efficiency of the police 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? (section  ? ? ) ?ď ) )ĂŶĚ ‘ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞŐŽŽĚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? 
(section (3)(c)).
17
  The somewhat fractious relationship between the African National Congress (ANC) 
administration at national level and the opposition-led government of the Western Cape, combined 
with the fact that, under the terms of section 206(1) of the Constitution, policing is primarily but not 
exclusively a national competence ?ŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĂƉƉointment soon became mired 
in political and legal wrangling.  The dispute between the two levels of government was only 
resolved when the Constitutional Court ruled that:  
[W]hilst a province has no control over the policing function, it has a legitimate interest that its 
residents are shielded from crime and that they enjoy the protection of effective, efficient and 
visible policing.  (Moseneke DCJ in Minister of Police and Others v Premier Western Cape and 
Others 2014 (1) SA (CC) at para 37)  
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It was common ground between the parties to the case that, under section 206(5), establishing a 
commission of inquiry was a constitutionally proper way of pursuing that interest ĂŶĚK ?ZĞŐĂŶĂŶĚ
Pikoli were eventually permitted to complete their investigation.
18
  
What is important to note from this is that K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ ?ƐŵĂŶĚĂƚĞwas derived from 
constitutional provisions that relate specifically and exclusively to the police.  They were not asked 
to conduct a more broadly based inquiry into whether residents of Khayelitsha were being afforded 
the socio-economic rights set out in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (the Bill of Rights) relating to 
housing (section 26), health care, food, water and social security (section 27) and education (section 
29).   
Equally significant is the question of political responsibility for the police, and where the blame for 
any shortcomings in their performance would lie.  The effect of sections 205  W 207 of the 
Constitution, confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Minister of Police and Others v Premier 
Western Cape and Others ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƐŚĂƉĞŽĨƚŚĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨWŽůŝĐĞ ‘ŵƵƐƚ
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝĐŝŶŐƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ) ?The National Commissioner appointed by the 
President must then exercise control over, and manage the police service in accordance with that 
policy (section 207(1) and (2)).  From the point of view of the Premier of the Western Cape, most if 
not all of the blame for any crisis in policing in Khayelitsha that K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ might find would lie 
with her opponents in the ANC, and the National Minister of Police in particular.  A wider ranging 
investigation into social conditions for which the Provincial government could also be held 
responsible might prove more awkward but, for the Premier, establishing an inquiry into policing 
must have seemed a relatively safe political bet.  
dŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ>ŽƌĚ^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƋuiry into the 
Brixton disorders of 10 and 12 April 1981 could hardly be more different. The disorders took place 
almost two years after the election in May 1979, with a majority of 43 seats in the House of 
Commons, of the first Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher.  As Scarman himself 
acknowledged in his report, 1981 was a time of  ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚhe polling 
company, Ipsos MORI, records that, in March of that year, the month preceding the Brixton 
ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌƐ ?ƉƵďůŝĐƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚwas at its lowest ebb.19  ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨĂŵŽƵƐůǇ
unwritten constitution, and highly centralised system of government, made it almost inevitable that 
her government would sustain some political damage resulting from an inquiry into the disorders, 
particularly insofar as the social effects of its radical economic policies were implicated in the origins 
of the disturbances.  It may well have been that, by indulging in what Sulitzeanu-<ĞŶĂŶĐĂůůƐĂ ‘ǀĞŶƵĞ
ĂůƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ? ?ƌĞƉůĂĐŝŶŐĂŵŽƌĞǀŽůĂƚŝůĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂ ?ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚ
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the public) with the more predictable one of a judge-led inquiry, the government were merely 
choosing the lesser of two evils.
20
   
The constitutional position was also relatively clear.  Under arrangements unique to the 
Metropolitan Police, the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, was responsible for policing in London 
not just as the government minister responsible for the police nationally, but also as the local police 
authority for the Metropolitan Police district.  These arrangements were to be hotly debated 
throughout much of the next decade but, as things stood in 1981, political responsibility for policing 
in Brixton lay squarely with the Home Secretary.  His response to events in Brixton was to establish 
an inquiry under section 32 of the Police Act 1964 ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ,ŽŵĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ‘ŵĂǇ
cause a local inquiry to be held by a person to be appointed by him into any matter connected with 
ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐŝŶŐŽĨĂŶǇĂƌĞĂ ?.21  >ŽƌĚ^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞǁĞƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ P ‘ƚŽŝŶƋƵŝƌĞŝŶƚŽ
the serious disorder in Brixton on 10 to 12 April 1981 and to report, with the power to make 
recommendĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?22  Though his inquiry was established under legislation providing for the 
governance of the police, he was invited, at least by implication, to range more widely in 
investigating the origins of the disorders ?hŶůŝŬĞK ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ ?^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐ of reference made 
no explicit, and possibly constraining, references to the police institution.  While the SAPS looms 
large in the mandate of the former, the Metropolitan Police is not mentioned in the appointment of 
the latter.   
FINDINGS 
^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽnse to this brief was bold.  He made the case for understanding policing in its social 
context in the introduction to his report in a passage that deserves to be quoted in full: 
Policing policy and methods, it is obvious, reflect in part a reaction by lawfully constituted 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƚŽƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇǁŚŝĐŚŝƐďĞŝŶŐƉŽůŝĐĞĚ ? “^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ ?ŝƐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ
with policing but, because policing methods operate in and are influenced by the social 
situation, it cannot stop at policing.  In this Inquiry, therefore, I have sought to identify not only 
the policing problem specific to the disorders but the social problem of which it is necessarily 
part.  The one cannot be understood or resolved save in the context of the other.
23
 
Although they were no more responsible for the social and economic problems besetting the 
ethnically diverse communities that live in inner city areas like Brixton than other citizens, the police 
had ƚŽ ‘ĂĚũƵƐƚƚŚĞŝƌƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĂŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ?ǁŝƚŚŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐ ? ?24  If they did not, 
^ĐĂƌŵĂŶĨĞĂƌĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ[would] ďĞĐŽŵĞĂĚŝƐĞĂƐĞĞŶĚĞŵŝĐŝŶŽƵƌƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?25 
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The profound and wide-ƌĂŶŐŝŶŐŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƌŝǆƚŽŶwas 
evident throughout Part II of his report.
26
  As he described it, Brixton in 1981 was a once prosperous, 
now decaying, commercial and residential centre with very serious housing problems and a lack of 
recreational facilities appropriate to the needs of young people forced into the idleness that goes 
with unemployment.
27
 The people of Brixton were more likely to be young, working class and 
transient than in either the rest of London or in the London Borough of Lambeth, the local authority 
area of which Brixton formed (and still forms) part.
28
  They were more likely to be members of a one-
parent family and to suffer from mental illness or have a mental or physical disability.
29
  Finally, and 
ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇĨŽƌƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞƚŚĂƚƐǁŝƌůĞĚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌƐĂŶĚ^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
to them, Brixton was one of the most ethnically diverse parts of London: 36% of the population of its 
ĨŝǀĞĐŽƵŶĐŝůǁĂƌĚƐǁĂƐ ‘ŶŽŶ-ǁŚŝƚĞ ?ƌŝƐŝŶŐto 49% in two of them.30  Moreover, in the two wards at the 
centre of the disturbances, black people of West Indian or African origin formed 30% of the total 
population but as many as 40% of 0-18 year olds and 50% of those between the ages of 19 and 21.
31
 
Scarman offered a stark analysis of the state of the black community in Brixton, leading one critical 
commentator to accuse him of ĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐĂ ‘ƉĂƚŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ĂŶĚĚŽǁŶƉůĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨ
both police and societal racism.
32
  In summary, he found that British social conditions had fractured 
the extended matriarchal structure of the West Indian family leading to high proportions of children 
finding themselves either in local authority care or in households headed by a lone parent.
33
  Young 
black people had been failed by the education system and lacked the language and other basis skills 
needed to find work in a technological age.
34
  CŽŵďŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ƌĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĂ ‘ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůďĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶŶĞƌĐŝƚǇ ? ?this meant that 
young people generally, and black youth in particular, faced unemployment, often for long periods.
35
 
With the benefit of hindsight, ^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŵŽƐƚĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂůĨŝŶĚŝŶŐǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚǇŽƵŶŐblack 
people experienced (mainly indirect) discrimination by employers in the work place and elsewhere, 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶǁĂƐŶŽƚ ‘ĂŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƌĂĐŝƐƚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? W at least if that phrase was taken to mean that it 
was ŽŶĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐůǇ ?ĂƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚďůĂĐŬƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?36 Summing up, 
Lord Scarman found that the black community in Brixton faced similar problems to those of their 
white neighbours.
37
  But they were more severe and were exacerbated by racial discrimination.
38
 
As a result, young black people may feel a particular sense of frustration and deprivation.  
Spending much of their lives on the street, they are there bound to come into contact with 
criminals and with the police.
39
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The police ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽŵĂŶǇǇŽƵŶŐďůĂĐŬƉĞŽƉůĞ ‘ĂƐƚŚĞǀŝƐŝďůĞƐǇŵďŽůƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽĨĂƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ
which has failed to bring them its benefits or do theŵũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?40  His conclusions on the nature of the 
disorders flowed from this: 
The disorders were communal disturbances arising from a complex political, social and economic 
situation ...  There was a strong racial element in the disorders, but they were not a race riot.  
The riots were essentially an outburst of anger and resentment by young people against the 
police.
41
 
K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ made much less of their efforts to contextualise policing in Khayelitsha.  Instead of 
explicitly asserting that problems in policing can only be seen as part of a much more extensive set 
of social problems, they assumed that an understanding of context is essential to the successful 
completion of their inquiry.  The sub-headings ŝŶƚŚĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƉŽƌƚŽŶ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨ<ŚĂǇĞůŝƚƐŚĂ ?give an indication of the issues they considered: geography, history, 
demographics, social and economic conditions and, finally, crime.
42
   
The picture of Khayelitsha that emerges is of a place that has varying levels of disadvantage.  It is 
home to almost half a million people over half of whom live in informal dwellings.
43
  Ethnically and 
linguistically homogenous  W 98.7% of residents surveyed for the 2011 census described themselves 
as Black/African; 89.8% spoke isiXhosa at home  W over two thirds of adults had been born in the 
Eastern Cape.
44
  In some of the newer settlements this proportion rose to over four in five.
45
  Well 
over a quarter of the population was under the age of 15.
46
 On average, Khayelitsha residents had 
completed no more than nine years of schooling and less than 5% had a tertiary educational 
qualification.
47
  Over 50% of young men up to the age of 23 were unemployed and three quarters of 
all households had incomes that meant they were unable to meet the cost of food and sustain the 
necessities of life.
48
  The number of households in Khayelitsha with on-site access to electricity, 
water and a toilet doubled between 1996 and 2011 but sanitation and street lighting remained 
especially contentious issues.
49
  In spite of a small drop in crime rates per capita since 2003/4, the 
Commission concluded that levels of crime made it unsurprising ƚŚĂƚ ‘a very high proportion of 
ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐŝŶ<ŚĂǇĞůŝƚƐŚĂĨĞĞůƵŶƐĂĨĞ ? ?50   
In short,  ‘ ?ĚĞĞƉ ?ůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ?ƉŽŽƌůĞǀĞůƐŽĨŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚǀĞƌǇhigh ĐƌŝŵĞƌĂƚĞƐ ?ŵĂĚĞ
polŝĐŝŶŐ<ŚĂǇĞůŝƚƐŚĂ ‘ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚůǇĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ ? ?ŝƚǁĂƐ ?ƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĨŽƵŶĚ ? ‘ĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ
ƉůĂĐĞĨŽƌ ?ƚŚĞ ?^W^ƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ?ŝŶ ? ?.51  If social and economic conditions provided the background to 
the many inefficiencies in policing identified in their report, K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ traced the roots of the 
ďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ^W^ĂŶĚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ<ŚĂǇĞůŝƚƐŚĂ ?s back to its 
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fiercely contested development in the final days of apartheid.
52
  dŚĞ^W^ ?ƐƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌ ?ƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚ
African Police, had been deeply implicated in pursuing the goals of apartheid including the control of 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶĨůƵǆ ?ŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌƵƌĂůĂƐƚĞƌŶCape and in fostering the violence that surrounded the 
creation ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ŶĞǁŚŽŵĞ ?ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞĂƉĞdŽǁŶ.53  
This history imposes a particular burden on SAPS to demonstrate its fairness, even-
handedness and respect for the residents of Khayelitsha in order to win the trust of the 
community.  Unlike in other parts of the world, SAPS cannot draw on a reservoir of good will 
that historical acceptance of the legitimacy of police work creates.
54
 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPACT 
The extent to which the reports of the two inquiries made recommendations in relation to the 
context of policing reflected the different approaches to presenting their findings.  Scarman devoted 
WĂƌƚs/ŽĨŚŝƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌƐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ ?.  He began it by rehearsing why 
 ‘ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƉŽůŝĐŝŶŐ ? ? ?ŵƵƐƚĞŵďƌĂĐĞƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ?ŝƚ ?ŝƐĐarried 
out ? before going on to call for a more co-ŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚĂĐŬůŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
inner cities as well as measures to meet the housing, education and employment needs of ethnic 
minorities.
55
  He also recommended that  ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐŝŶĂƌĞĂƐ
ŽĨĂĐƵƚĞĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? )ďĞƚĂŬĞŶƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨƌĂĐŝĂůĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?56   
Far-reaching though his proposals were in some respects, he was careful to avoid saying anything 
ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ‘ƐĐĂůĞŽĨƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĚĞǀŽƚĞĚƚŽŝŶŶĞƌĐŝƚǇŽƌĞƚŚŶŝĐŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇŶĞĞĚƐ ? ?57  This, 
he said, was a matter for government and parliament.
58
  Reflecting on the response to his report at a 
conference held a year after the riots in April 1982, Scarman offered an upbeat, not to say bullish, 
assessment.  His conclusion about the disturbances having complicated political, social and 
economic roots quoted earlier had been accepted as  ‘ďĞǇŽŶĚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ?ĂŶĚŚĂĚ ‘ďĞĐŽŵĞŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ
unspoken assumptions upon which social and police rĞĨŽƌŵƐĂƌĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂŶĚƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚ ? ?59  He was 
ƉůĞĂƐĞĚǁŝƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƐŽĨĞƚŚŶŝĐŵŝŶŽƌŝƚŝĞƐďƵƚĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
continued lack of co-ordinated action on inner city problems and uncertain about the fate of his 
recommendation on positive action.
60
 
Four years later, in 1986, at another conference held after more rioting in British cities the previous 
ǇĞĂƌ ?ŵƵĐŚŽĨ^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŽƉƚŝŵŝƐŵŚĂĚĞǀĂƉŽƌĂƚĞĚĂŶĚŚĞǁĂƐŵŽǀĞĚƚŽĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ
speaker, Usha Prashar, that his social and economic recommendations had not been implemented.
61
  
As Stuart Hall commented over a decade later ?^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĂďůĞĨŽƌďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞ
 ‘ƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐůĂǁ-and-ŽƌĚĞƌĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ?ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶƐŽĨĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌbut the social and economic 
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reforms he had proposĞĚǁĞƌĞ ‘ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇŽƵƚŽĨŬĞǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƐĂŶĚ ?ŚĂĚ ?ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĞĚŶŽƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽƌƉŽůŝĐǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ? ?62 Worse still, though his advocacy of a community-oriented approach to 
policing had become the dominant philosophy of police leaders in England and Wales by the end of 
the 1980s, his findings on racism failed to stand the test of time and were flatly contradicted in the 
report of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry published in 1999.
63
  This stated that institutional racism 
 ?ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĂŶĚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽůŽƵƌ ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ŽƌĞƚŚŶŝĐŽƌŝŐŝŶ ? )ĞǆŝƐƚĞĚŶŽƚũƵƐƚŝŶƚŚĞ
Metropolitan Police Service and other police services but in other institutions across Britain.
64
  
There is no equivalent ƚŽWĂƌƚs/ŽĨ^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƌŝǆƚŽŶĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌƐin the report of the 
Khayelitsha Commission.  dŚĞƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐƐĞƚŽƵƚŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?ŽĨK ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝtouch on 
some of the problems  W vengeance killings and attacks, youth gangs, unlicensed liquor outlets and 
domestic violence - that make policing in the area so challenging.  But their emphasis is very much 
on the style, organisation and delivery of police services by the SAPS: on committing to community 
policing, reviewing the deployment of human resources and adopting a model of policing based on 
procedural justice.   
Reaction to the K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ report since it was published on 25 August 2014 had been muted 
until shortly before the anniversary of its publication.  Then, on 7 August 2015, the Premier of the 
Western Cape, Helen Zille, issued a statement giving vent to her frustration at what she evidently 
saw as the failure of the National Minister of Police, Nkosinathi Nhleko, to respond to it, and of the 
SAPS to sign a memorandum of understanding with the Provincial Department of Community Safety 
(DoCS) clarifying their respective roles and responsibilities in relation to policing in Khayelitsha.
65
  
Such a memorandum was, she said, essential to taking action ŽŶƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨK ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ ?Ɛ
recommendations, although progress had already been made on holding elections to Community 
Police Forums (CPFs), providing training to their members, bringing civil society groups together to 
prevent vengeance attacks and creating awareness about crimes against women and children.
66
    
In her statement, Premier Zille also announced that, having received no response to inquiries about 
ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨĂ ‘ƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ<ŚĂǇĞůŝƚƐŚĂŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŚĂŶĚĞĚŽǀĞƌďǇ
the National Commissioner of the SAPS, General Riah Phiyega, at a meeting on 8 June, she would 
make the document available to the media and the public at large.
67
  This document, signed by 
'ĞŶĞƌĂůWŚŝǇĞŐĂĂŶĚĚĂƚĞĚ ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?ďƵƚŝƐƐƵĞĚ ‘ďǇĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨWŽůŝĐĞ ? ?ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐ
an uncompromising defence of the SAPS.
68
  It criticises the Commission for adding to negative public 
perceptions of the SAPS and dismisses its work ĂƐĂŶƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ P ‘dŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ
highlighted what was already known and buttress [sic] what the SAPS has been talking about all 
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ĂůŽŶŐĂŶĚĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ ? ?69  dŚĞƌĞŝƐůŝƚƚůĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ^W^ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞthus far to suggest either 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞďŝƚƚĞƌŶĞƐƐƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŚĂƐĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉĂƐƐĂŐĞŽĨ
time, or that the ANC and national government are prepared to take sole responsibility for the social 
and economic conditions prevailing in Khayelitsha.  On the contrary, General Phiyega notes that, 
[W]hile its mandate was only to investigate policing, the Commission also found that a lack 
of proper investment by the [opposition-run] City of Cape Town and the Provincial 
Government in infrastructure such as toilets, street lights and roads had made policing more 
difficult and increased residents [sic] vulnerability to violent crime.
70
 
With the Premier of the Western Cape and the National Commissioner (with the Minister, 
apparently, behind her) drawing their rhetorical daggers, the prospects for political consensus over 
the future of policing in Khayelitsha, and how the circumstances under which it takes place might be 
iŵƉƌŽǀĞĚ ?ĂƉƉĞĂƌďůĞĂŬ ?zĞƚ ?ŝĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ'ĞŶĞƌĂůWŚŝǇĞŐĂ ?Ɛ ?ƐĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĚƌafted by the 
Provincial DoCS is to be believed, relationships on the ground may be rather more productive than 
the political war of words would imply as progress is already being made by DoCS, the SAPS and 
other role-players in turning policing in Khayelitsha around.
71
  
CONCLUSION 
The central argument of this article is that, as Scarman had done over thirty years before, 
K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ acknowledged that problems in policing (whether they present as acute in the case of 
Brixton or chronic as in Khayelitsha) are only fathomable if they are set in their wider social context.  
The approaches adopted in the reports of the two inquiries differ: where Scarman emphasised the 
connection between social and economic conditions and policing as a, if not the, guiding principle of 
his work, K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ were more understated in their commitment to understanding the context 
of policing.  This may well reflect differences in the salience of policing and the police institution in 
their respective terms of references, but it can also be surmised that these approaches owed 
something to the political conditions under which the inquiries were appointed.  In the light of the 
reticence shown by other inquiries, set up under not dissimilar circumstances, the fact that both 
Scarman aŶĚK ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝĐŚŽƐĞƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞƐĞŝƐƐƵĞƐĂƚĂůůŝƐĂƚĞƐƚĂŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽ
seek explanations for poor policing beyond the actions of those responsible for delivering it, and to 
interpret their respective terms of reference in such a way as to permit them to do so.    
What emerged from both inquiries was that people who lack a significant stake in society and feel 
that they get little or nothing from the state are likely to lack the trust and confidence in its agents 
on which public policiŶŐŝŶĂĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĚĞƉĞŶĚƐ ?ŶĚ ?ĂƚƚŝŵĞƐŽĨĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?ǁŚĞŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŽŶůǇ
12 
 
point of contact with the state may well be with the police  W police that are seen as routinely acting 
against rather than for them - protests against the police and their actions become freighted with 
anger stemming from a much wider set of frustrations and resentments.   
Although he did not say so in quite so many words, Scarman implied that genuine and sustainable 
police reform was impossible if the conditions under which policing was done remained unchanged.   
Reading the conclusions reached by K ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝ on the long shadow cast by the history of 
Khayelitsha, and the extremely testing environment in which the SAPS currently operates, it is hard 
to see them disagreeing.  zĞƚ ?ŝĨ^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝƐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŽŐŽďǇ ?ƉĞƌƐƵĂĚŝŶŐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ
to rethink their economic and social policies is some way beyond the compass of any ad hoc body 
with a mandate limited to policing.  The complexities of the constitutional and political situation in 
South Africa, with the opposition-led City of Cape Town and Western Cape Provincial Government 
ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚƚŚĞK ?ZĞŐĂŶ ?WŝŬŽůŝŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ against the wishes of the ANC, the SAPS and the 
National Minister for Police, make it unlikely that either side in an increasingly bitter war of words 
over its findings and recommendations will be anxious to tackle the contextual issues identified in 
their report.  With political survival at stake, and the diktats of neo-liberalism so firmly implanted in 
the minds of early Thatcherite true-believers and more recent South African converts among the 
ANC and its political rivals in the Western Cape alike, the temptation to tinker with the police 
institution and scratch at the surface of the social problems to which it alone cannot offer a remotely 
adequate response becomes hard to resist.   
* Bill Dixon is Professor of Criminology in the School of Sociology and Social Policy at the 
University of Nottingham.  He would like to thank the two anonymous peer reviewers for their 
very helpful comments on this article in draft form. 
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